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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, was convicted 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, of the crime of the distribution of 
a controlled substance for value in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8, (1953, as amended). The Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, Judge, presided. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty by the jury of 
the crime of the distribution of a controlled substance 
for value and was sentenced on December 16, 197 5, by 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, to the Utah State Prison 
for an indefinite term not to exceed fifteen years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this 
Court affirming the verdict of the jury and the 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was tried on charges of distri-
bution of a controlled substance for value on December 
8, 1975, in Salt Lake County. 
Sixteen potential jurors were called and sworn 
(T.3). During voir dire the judge asked if any of the 
potential jurors were acquainted with the possible 
witnesses (T.9). He then, individually, questioned the 
four people who responded that they had all previously 
served on juries which had rendered guilty verdicts in 
cases that involved at least one of the state's witnesses. 
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All four people stated this previous jury experience 
would not make any difference in their ability to 
render a verdict solely on the evidence presented 
in the present case (T.9,10). 
After voir dire the prosecuting attorney passed 
the panel for cause (T.19). The defense counsel 
requested leave and was granted the right to reserve 
any challenges for cause until after the empaneling 
process (T.19). The defense counsel and the prosecuting 
attorney each used their peremptory challenges. The 
remaining eight jurors, including two of the four 
people with similar prior jury experience, were sworn 
to try the case (T.19,20). 
Following the prosecutor's opening statement 
defense counsel challenged for cause the four afore-
mentioned people on grounds that they had all served 
as jurors in cases involving the same charge and the 
same state's witnesses (T.23). The challenge was 
denied by the court (T.24). 
Salt Lake policemen Michael Roberts and Jerry 
L. Mendez (not Kenneth L. Thirsk as alleged in appellant's 
Statement of Facts) and an undercover operative v/orking 
for the police, Denise Giertz, were the witnesses for 
the prosecution. 
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Officer Roberts testified that he drove Ms. 
Giertz to the vicinity of the West Side Motel, that 
she left the car on foot and returned ten minutes 
later v/ith a balloon of heroin in her mouth (T.51,52). 
Ms. Giertz testified that she walked to the 
Regal Lounge where she located the defendant, told 
him she wanted to buy some heroin, and he said it 
would cost thirty-five dollars (T.37-39). They then 
walked to the West Side Motel, which was two doors 
down from the Regal Lounge. There she gave defendant 
$40.00 in exchange for a balloon of heroin. . She 
placed the balloon in her mouth, left the motel and 
returned to the police car (T.40). 
The appellant was called as witness in his 
own behalf and denied the occurrence of both the 
alleged conversation and the sale of heroin to Ms. 
Giertz (T.144). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE JURY PANEL 
WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON JURIES RENDERING GUILTY 
VERDICTS IN SIMILAR CASES IN WHICH THE SAME STATE'S 
WITNESSES HAD TESTIFIED. 
The statute upon which appellant's single 
argument is based is Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(5) 
(1953, as amended), which reads in part: 
"A challenge for implied bias 
may be taken for all or any of the 
following causes and for no other: 
(5) having served on a trial 
jury which has tried another person 
for the offense charged." 
As appellant correctly noted in his brief, 
one construction of this statutory language is that 
a juror is not automatically disqualified to serve 
on a jury merely because he previously sat on a jury' 
which tried another defendant for the same offense, 
but arising out of a separate fact situation. 
Respondent submits that this is not only a possible 
construction for this language; this is the only 
logical construction of this language. 
If the legislature had intended such similar, 
previous jury service to be automatic grounds for 
disqualification of potential jurors it easily could 
have specified this in a statute with explicit language 
to that effect. However, the present statute dealing 
with implied bias says only that a challenge "may 
be taken" for that reason. Such language does not 
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require a court to automatically sustain such a 
challenge once it is made. 
This section of the statute only.establishes 
one of many criteria that must be reviewed and 
questioned in order to determine the impartiality, 
or lack thereof, of the potential jurors. Once the 
fact of similar jury experience is shown to exist 
it is up to the trial judge to explore further and 
determine if this fact will hamper the defendant's 
right to an impartial jury. 
The role of the trial court in this determination 
was defined by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. 
Carpenter, 215 Kan. 573, 527 P.2d 1333 (1974). 
"Unless a qualification for 
cause is mandatory as a matter of 
law under the statute, it presents 
an issue of fact to be determined 
by the trial court and rests within 
the trial court's sound discretion. 
The trial court is in a much better 
position than this court to view the 
demeanor of the prospective juror 
and listen to his answers." Id. at 
1337. 
In the present case the trial court judge 
recognized his role and once it was determined that 
four potential jurors had sat on similar cases with 
some or all of the same state's witnesses, he properly 
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and adequately questioned each one, individually, 
to ascertain their possible biases in this regard. 
These four people all responded that they 
understood that these were two distinct and 
separate trials. They further stated that they could 
render a verdict solely on evidence received in this 
trial (T.9-11). None of them felt that this previous 
experience would influence their verdict in the case 
at hand (T.13) . 
After this voir dire examination the judge 
was satisfied that this previous jury experience did 
not render any of these potential jurors biased and 
therefore denied defense counsel's challenge for causs 
of these four persons (T.24). 
A similar situation existed in Disheroon v. 
State, 514 P.2d 685 (Okla. Cr. 1973). In that case 
defendant was also charged with unlawful delivery of 
a controlled dangerous substance. Five members of that 
jury had rendered a conviction on the same charge 
against a different defendant the day before the trial 
against Disheroon ccnmenced. Defense counsel asserted 
that the fact that these jurors had decided and rendered 
such a conviction was "per se evidence of prejudice of 
those five members of the jury." The court did not 
agree with this assertion and after studying the 
counsel's voir dire examination on this point the court 
concluded: 
"The record of counsel's examination 
of those jurors is wholly insufficient 
to support excusing those jurors for 
cause. Since the record does not support 
counsel's assignment of prejudice 
we find this proposition is without 
merit. . . . " Id. at 688. 
Federal courts have agreed with the rule that 
the record must show that bias exists before a challenge 
based on previous jury experience will be sustained. 
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 
476 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1973), defendant was charged 
with distribution of marijuana and some of the jurors 
had served on similar cases involving the same govern-
ment witnesses. In answering the defense counsel's 
challenge to these jurors the court stated: 
"The federal courts have uniformly 
held that absent some evidence of 
actual partiality, a juror is not 
disqualified merely because he previously 
sat in a similar case arising out of a 
separate and distinct set of circum-
stances even though the offenses 
charged in the cases are similar and 
some of the same prosecuting witnesses 
testify in each case." Id. at 773. 
(cases omitted). 
In addition, Haussener v. United States, 4F.2d 
884 (8th Cir. 1925), which is referred to in appellant's 
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brief, is an early example of the federal court 
adoption of this policy. Appellant contends that 
the court in Haussener attached more importance to 
saving of the court's time than to protecting 
defendant's right to an impartial jury. This is a 
very limited reading of the opinion. The court did 
address itself to the impractibility of requiring 
totally new jurors for every case involving a violation; 
of the Volstead Act, but then went on to say: 
"We are not saying that, if the 
jurors had by their answers disclosed 
a state of opinion that would have 
prevented a fair and impartial trial, 
or an unprejudiced consideration of 
all of the evidence offered, that 
they would be competent jurors; 
but it will be observed that no 
such state-of mind is shown by the 
voir dire examination. . . (a) 
novel practice like that here dis-
closed ought not to be permitted, 
except in the face of a situation 
clearly showing the bias, prejudice 
or lack of impartiality of the juror. 
In this the record fails." Id. at 887. 
A careful study of the trial record in the 
present case will likewise reveal that there is no 
merit in defendant's challenge of these four persons. 
There was no partiality revealed at all after a 
thorough voir dire examination. Defendant's right to 
an impartial jury was in no way jeopardized by the 
presence of these four people on the jury panel. 
Appellant relies on these rather antiquated 
cases to support the proposition that that statute 
should be construed to read that jurors with jury 
experience in similar cases, involving the same state's 
witnesses should be disqualified. All three cases 
can be distinquished from the present case. 
Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 171 P. 137 
(1918) dealt with a defendant charged with selling 
intoxicating liquors. Five members of the jury panel 
had just previously served on a jury involving the 
same charge against John Duff, a fellow bartender of 
Priestly1s. Duff and Priestly worked in the same 
establishment, and planned and used the exact same 
scheme to dispose of the intoxicating liquor. Unlike 
the instant case, there was a strong similarity and 
relationship of the defendants and their criminal 
activity in Priestly. The two defendants were really 
"partners in crime" and the inference of partiality 
after having heard one of these cases and rendering 
a guilty verdict is much more conclusive than in the 
present case where the charge is the same but the 
defendants are totally unrelated and the place and 
circumstances of each crime are substantially different. 
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The same argument can be made against the use 
of Popp v. State, 44 Okla. Crim. 220, 230 P.478 
(1929). In that case one of the jurors had served 
on a jury which rendered a guilty verdict against the 
defendant's mother for the same charge just prior to 
commencement of defendant's trial. Again the close 
relationship of the defendants and their crimes 
made it extremely difficult to accept a finding 
of impartiality. 
Roberts v. State, 4Ga. App. 378, 61 S.E. 497 
(1908) involved a defendant charged with distribution 
of alcohol. The distinguishing factor in that case 
is that the trial court did not allow voir dire 
examination of potential jurors as to past service 
on a comparable jury. The judge in Roberts, supra, 
did not recognize or properly execute his role in this 
regard. The Court of Appeals in this case thought 
such questioning was proper and should have been 
allowed. 
As noted earlier, no such impropriety or abuse 
of discretion existed in the present case because the 
trial court judge appropriately examined all potential 
jurors and directed adequate questions to this specific 
point. 
One final point should be noted. Appellant 
contends that the jurors with previous experience had 
already accepted the credibility of the state's witnesses 
and therefore had foreclosed any defense that he might 
have had by an attack on the credibility of these 
witnesses. 
Realistically, however, merely because a juror 
accepts that a witness is credible in one case 
does not establish that witness1 credibility forever. 
Each different fact situation presents different 
factors from which the juror can judge the credibility 
of each witness. The circumstances of the case, 
the witness1 involvement in the case, the demeanor of 
the witness in the courtroom will all vary in any 
particular case. The juror who found a witness1 
testimony very credible in one instance may decide that 
the same witness is not so credible in a different, 
albeit similar, case. 
If the juror can maintain an open mind as to 
the establishment of credibility of each witness in 
every case no significant partiality as to a given 
witness will resultf The jurors involved in the 
present case all displayed confidence that they could 
maintain an open mind and the judge v/as satisfied with 
their appraisal of their ability to be impartial. 
His judgment is based on his personal observations and 
should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah statute concerning implied bias should 
be interpreted literally. It should be viewed as 
a list of situations which may give rise to implied 
bias. It must be left within the duty of the trial 
judge to determine if any such implied bias does in 
fact exist in any given case. 
The trial court judge in the present case 
protected defendant's right to an impartial jury by 
properly examining all jurors with previous similar 
jury experience. The determination by the judge that 
no implied bias existed due to this factor was within 
his discretion and should not be overturned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
